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This paper studies how the arrival of more precise information aﬀects welfare in an economy with
incomplete and diﬀerential information. We consider a single period, pure exchange economy with
aggregate uncertainty in which agents show diﬀerent attitudes towards risk: wealthy individuals are
‘de facto’ less risk averse than poor individuals. The ﬁrst ones can then partially insure the last
ones, allowing for mutual gains from trade. Agents ignore the actual probability distribution over
the states. Instead, they learn from the market price and private signals, which in fact accounts for
the presence of heterogeneous beliefs. In equilibrium, the dispersion in beliefs introduces an adverse
eﬀect: risk-taking agents are more pessimistic than the rest. This limits the possibilities to share
risks and has a negative impact on welfare. The arrival of more precise information has therefore a
double eﬀect: it weakens the adverse eﬀect on trade (as risk-taking agents become more optimistic,
they oﬀer more insurance) at the same time that it strengthens the Hirshleifer eﬀect (agents are no
longer able to insure against news that have already arrived). The ﬁrst eﬀect fosters and the second
one discourages risk-sharing trades. The paper discusses in detail a case where the positive eﬀect on
trade oﬀsets the negative eﬀect. This lets us conclude that in an economy with partial information,
agents’ welfare may increase upon the receipt of more precise information. Even though the result
looks intuitive, most of the previous literature has focused on the case with homogeneous beliefs. In
such a framework, only the Hirshleifer eﬀect is at work, and thus better information typically leads
to a decrease in welfare.
Keywords: Information and Welfare, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Partially Revealing Prices
JEL Classiﬁcation: D81 Introduction
Thanks to the explosive development of the Internet and the World Wide Web, the last decade has
witnessed a dramatic change in the technology to access information. At the same time, the advances in
the computer technology has made possible to process a signiﬁcantly larger amount of information than
it was possible a few years ago. The changes are particularly shocking when we look at ﬁnancial markets.
Nowadays, any individual can get access to specialized reports, series of data or the latest news before
trading. Thus, no one would question that market participants have become much more sophisticated
compared to what they were twenty years ago. The question remains whether these changes have been
accompanied by an increase in welfare. The intuition suggests that more precise information should lead
to better decisions and hence, should be welfare improving. The examples below, however, challenge
this common sense view and illustrate cases where the receipt of more information may be harmful.
Lerman et al. (1996) describe the results of a survey conducted among members of families with
BRCA1-linked hereditary breast-ovarian cancer.1 They ﬁnd that 57 % of the individuals interviewed
declined to take a free BRCA1 test. One of the reasons listed against being tested was the possibility of
losing health insurance. Quaid and Morris (1993) reports a similar behavior in a sample of individuals
who were oﬀered a free test of Huntington’s disease.
Since 1994 the Federal Reserve announces interest rate changes at pre-scheduled and publicly avail-
able dates. The decisions are made public after the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee.
The Fed deviated from this scheme in January and April of 2001, when it decided to cut interest rates
well before the next scheduled meeting. Banerjee and Seccia (2002) ﬁnd evidence of abnormal volumes
of trade in interest rate futures the day before the scheduled meeting, but they ﬁnd no evidence of excess
trade before the two unscheduled announcements. They conclude that the two unexpected interest rate
cuts might have had a negative impact on welfare, if a fraction of the abnormal trade is motivated by
hedging purposes. In those two opportunities, agents did not have the possibility to insure against inter-
est rate changes. This example illustrates a theoretical result in Sulganik and Zilcha (1996). They argue
that when future markets are available, in which case agents can share risks, the value of information
may not always be positive. A similar conclusion is obtained by Drees and Eckwert (2003). They argue
1The isolation of the BRCA1 gene allows to learn if the individual carries a cancerpredisposing mutation that increases
the probability of developing breast or ovarian cancer.
1that more transparency in the foreign exchange market may reduce welfare when agents can hedge the
currency risk.
The previous papers illustrate a general principle: the arrival of more accurate information may be
harmful if it precludes risk sharing trades, agents cannot insure against events that are not longer uncer-
tain. Dr` eze (1960) was the ﬁrst to identify the possibility that information may have a negative value,
but the result is commonly known in the literature as the ‘Hirshleifer eﬀect’. Hirshleifer (1971) formal-
ized Dr` eze’s argument using a general equilibrium framework. Consider an Edgeworth box economy
with one good, two agents and two states of the world. The state probabilities are common knowledge.
In such a framework, if markets open before the state realization is known, agents trade to a point on
the contract curve. But if markets open after the state of the world has been publicly disclosed, no
trade takes place. In that case, better information leads to a worse consumption allocation.
The present paper analyzes how the receipt of more precise information aﬀects welfare in a pure
exchange economy with incomplete information and one round of trading. The model has two main
features: there is uncertainty about the state that will be realized in the future; and agents are aﬀected
asymmetrically in diﬀerent states. The latter allows them to share risks and partially insure against the
states where they are unlucky. The structure of the model captures an important feature of ﬁnancial
markets: agents trade to share risks, but also because they have diﬀerent expectations about the assets
being traded.
We consider a pure exchange economy where agents can invest in two assets: a risk free bond and a
risky asset, namely a tree. The tree pays either high or low dividends. The ex-ante probabilities of these
events are not known, but each agent receives private signals about the tree. Each signal can be either
good or bad. The probability of receiving a good signal depends on the probability that the tree pays
high dividends. The last feature is what makes the signals informative. Agents also receive a riskless
endowment that may take either a high or low value. The fraction of agents receiving a high riskless
endowment, the rich ones, is also unknown. We assume agents share the same preferences, which can be
represented by a concave utility function with decreasing coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Thus, rich
individuals are ‘de-facto’ less risk averse than poor individuals, so the former tend to insure the latter.
Markets open before the tree pays oﬀ. The equilibrium price of the risky asset depends on two variables:
the probability of high dividends (which determines the distribution of signals across agents) and the
2fraction of rich agents. Agents face a nontrivial signal extraction problem: they see a price but cannot
infer its two underlying determinants. Their posterior belief is based on three pieces of information:
the price, the private signals about the tree and the individual realization of the riskless endowment. If
agents could observe the fraction of rich agents before trading, they would be able to use the equilibrium
price to infer the actual probability with which the tree pays high dividends. In our framework, however,
agents are not able to infer that probability because the distribution of endowments is also unknown.
In the extreme case where everyone is fully informed, the model predicts that rich agents insure
poor agents by purchasing risky assets and selling risk free bonds. This prediction may not hold in the
partial information economy considered in the present paper. The reason is the following one. If an
agent receives a low endowment, he infers that the fraction of poor agents in the economy is relatively
high. In other words, agents who are hit with a shock that induces them to sell stocks (i.e. a low
endowment), believe that there are many others in the same situation. So a low endowment serves as a
signal that the excess demand of stocks is low. Conversely, rich agents believe that the excess demand
of stocks is high. This leads to diﬀerent interpretations of the market price. For a given price, poor
(rich) agents perceive there are more (less) agents who dislike risks, so they infer that the reason why
agents demand stocks is because they oﬀer a ‘high’ (low) expected return. In summary, agents who are
hit with a low endowment tend to be more ‘optimistic’ than agents with high endowments. This eﬀect
dampens the incentives to share risks. As agents become more sophisticated and acquire more precise
information, i.e. more signals, the dispersion of the beliefs shrinks, which tends to oﬀset the previous
negative eﬀect.
We ﬁnd that more precise information about the underlying source of risk can enhance or reduce the
possibilities to share risks among agents, leading to a increase or decrease in welfare, respectively. The
Hirshleifer eﬀect is still present in our model, but there is another channel through which information
aﬀects the equilibrium allocation: the dispersion of beliefs. The model describes a case where beliefs’
heterogeneity is such that discourages trading. In those cases, better information reduces the dispersion
of beliefs and hence, has a positive welfare eﬀect.
If the asymmetric information assumption were abandoned and agents received common signals,
instead of private signals, the model would belong to the set of economies studied in Schlee (2001). We
would expect therefore to observe a decrease in individual welfare after the arrival of better information.
3The present paper, however, oﬀers a diﬀerent conclusion, showing that Schlee’s result depends crucially
on the homogeneity of beliefs and do not extend to economies with diﬀerential information.
1.1 Related Literature
Several authors have studied more general frameworks to test the validity of Hirshliefer’s result. Marshall
(1974) analyzes the value of public information when individuals can trade before and after the arrival
of information. He concludes that:
If the impact of information is insured before its arrival, that insurance precludes further
trade based on the news. ... In all, the information has no impact on distribution, no impact
on satisfaction, and hence, no value.
In the contrary case when the news must arrive before its impact is insured in a prelim-
inary market, the information is harmful. People can aﬀord to pay something to suppress
the news or to delay its arrival. ... Public information in this situation is harmful; at best
its impact can be counteracted by prior insurance. 2
A similar conclusion is obtained in Ng (1975) and Green (1981). Hakansson et al. (1982) provide
suﬃcient and necessary conditions for public information to have positive social value. 3 Their results,
though, rely on the fact that agents can trade prior to the arrival of information. If that market is
missing, they cannot rule out the possibility that better information may decrease social welfare. Schlee
(2001) focuses on the last case, where individuals trade after the receipt of information. He concludes
that better information typically reduces every agent’s welfare in any of the following situations: there is
no aggregate risk; some agents are risk neutral; or the economy behaves as if there were a representative
agent.
It must be said that with the exception of Green (1981), the papers described before assume there
is a common signal in the economy. Agents update their beliefs after the signal is announced and then
trade. The common signal assumption simpliﬁes the analysis considerably as agents do not need to learn
from the prices. In eﬀect, the latter do not convey any information that is not contained in the signal.
This simpliﬁes the analysis considerably but, as the present paper shows, it may bias the conclusions.
Besides, the assumption that individuals hold homogeneous beliefs lacks empirical support.
2Marshall (1974), p 380.
3They show that if the initial endowments are an equilibrium allocation without information, then the arrival of
public information leads to a Pareto superior consumption allocation in any of the following cases: the marginal rates of
substitutions are not equalized across agents, or there is suﬃcient asymmetry in the posterior beliefs.
4The assumption that prices reveal valuable information has been extensively studied in the literature.
The ﬁrst generation of models developed by Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig
(1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Verrecchia (1982), and Admati (1985) prevents prices from
fully revealing the fundamentals of the economy by assuming the existence of liquidity traders. The
latter display a random behavior and distort the information conveyed by the price. Even though these
models have allowed to obtain valuable insights in many areas, the assumption of liquidity traders makes
them unsuitable for welfare analysis. Among the papers that have been able to obtain partially revealing
prices without resorting to noise traders, we should mention Ausubel (1990a). Since the structure of
our model share some similarities with his work, we defer a more detailed discussion until the end of
section 2.
There is another family of models, considered in Bhattacharya and Matthew (1991), Rahi (1996)
and Mar´ ın and Rahi (2000), that also allow for the existence of partially revealing equilibria without
assuming the presence of noise traders. These models introduce an asymmetry in the information held
by agents, i.e., they assume there is a group that is more informed than the rest. This generates
and adverse selection eﬀect: uninformed agents reduce their participation in the market because of
their informational disadvantage. In that framework, the receipt of more precise information not only
strengthens the Hirshleifer eﬀect but also dampens the adverse selection eﬀect. Thus, more information
does not necessarily lead to a decrease in welfare. Even though the conclusion is similar to the one
described in the present paper, the mechanisms explaining the result are diﬀerent. The disparities in
the level of information appears as a sensible assumption when we consider trades on assets issued by
private companies, in which case there may be leakages of privileged information. However, it is a
harder assumption to justify when we look at trades on assets linked to aggregate variables, like interest
rates or exchange rates futures. Besides, the modelling strategy followed in the present paper allows for
a straightforward comparison with the existing literature. In fact, our model could be mapped into the
set of economies considered by Schlee (2001) if agents received public signals instead of private signals.
Among the papers that have explicitly analyzed the relationship between welfare and information
in economies with partially revealing equilibria, we ﬁnd Berk (1997). He analyzes a simple dynamic
game and concludes that it is possible for an equilibrium to exist in which agents choose to purchase
information even if all agents, including the agents who purchased the information, are made strictly
5worse oﬀ from an ex ante perspective.
Citanna and Villanacci (2000) study a class of models with partially revealing prices, multiple goods,
asymmetric information and heterogeneous wealth. They ﬁnd that welfare may increase after the arrival
of more precise information. The reason is that wealth eﬀects due to price changes may outweigh the
Hirshleifer eﬀect. Gottardi and Rahi (2001) also analyze a model with asymmetric information and
reach a similar conclusion. Besides, they are able to disentangle the diﬀerent channels through which
the arrival of better information aﬀects welfare.4
The present paper also utilizes a model with partially revealing prices and asymmetric information
to assess the value of public information. Unlike Citanna and Villanacci (2000), the beliefs’ updating
scheme is endogenous and is interlinked across agents. Also, their results cannot be extended to the
present paper, since they depend on a countable number of states and more than two goods.
Finally, we should mention that a positive relationship between the precision of public information
and welfare can also be observed once the endowment economy framework is abandoned. In a model
with production, the early arrival of public information has an additional eﬀect: it may allow for
better investment decisions. In order to relativize the negative impact of information, Hirshleifer (1971)
provides an example where the last eﬀect dominates and better information is welfare enhancing. In a
recent paper, Eckwert and Zilcha (2003) study more formally the value of information in an economy
with production. They assume that the production function is subject to a productivity shock that
consists of the sum of two random variables. Agents have partial information about the realization
of one of these variables and trade on that information. The authors show that information about
non-tradable risks has always a positive value.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and deﬁnes the equilibrium concept
used in the paper. Section 3 describes the criteria for choosing the baseline parametrization. Section 4
presents the results. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
4The structure of the model considered in their paper allows only for a fully revealing equilibrium. Thus, in order for
the asymmetric information assumption to play any role, they have to use a deﬁnition of equilibrium that is less restrictive
than the standard rational expectations equilibrium concept used in the literature.
62 The model
The paper applies the baseline model presented in Hatchondo et al. (2003) to study how the receipt
of more accurate information aﬀects agents’ welfare. Even though the model has a simple structure,
it does not allow for a tractable analytical solution, so we must rely thus on numerical techniques to
characterize the equilibrium.
We consider a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information and heterogeneous agents.
There is a single risky asset in the economy: a tree. The tree pays high dividends with probability º
and low dividends with probability 1 ¡º. The tree pays only once and then dies. There is a measure 1
of agents in the economy and everybody is initially entitled with a share of the tree. Agents also receive
a riskless endowment, though some of them are luckier than others, i.e., a fraction Á of the population
receives a high endowment, while a fraction 1 ¡ Á receives a low endowment.
The parameters º and Á are drawn from a joint probability distribution F (º;Á). The latter is
common knowledge. The random variable º takes values on the unit interval I ´ [0;1]. The random
variable Á is discrete and takes values on Φ = fÁl;Áhg.
Agents are not able to observe the realizations of those variables but receive informative signals
about the tree. Each signal can be either good or bad. Every agent receives n number of signals. The
realizations of the signals are drawn from a Binomial distribution with parameter º. As the number of
signals increases, the information agents receive becomes more accurate. The case where º is common
knowledge corresponds to an inﬁnite number of signals.
The assumption described in the previous paragraph deserves two comments. First, we acknowledge
that there exist other mechanisms that can be used to model the transmission of information instead of
the binary signals structure. We choose the latter for the sake of simplicity. Second, the paper is silent
about how the number of signals is determined. In order to circumvent this limitation, the model could
be interpreted as a case where agents decide the number of signals they purchase. 5 The process of
acquisition of information is not the main focus of this paper, so it is not modelled explicitly.
All the action takes place in a single period. Markets open in the morning, the tree pays oﬀ in the
afternoon and agents consume at the end of the day. In the absence of trade, agents consume their
5See Verrecchia (1982) for a case where agents decide the precision of the information acquired.
7endowments and dividends paid by the tree. Actually, this would be the equilibrium allocation if there
was no heterogeneity across agents. This is not the case in the present framework, though. Poor agents
have a stronger preference for consumption smoothing than wealthy individuals, so there are gains from
trade. 6
Agents can transfer resources freely across the two states of nature that can be realized, i.e., whether
the tree pays high or low dividends. This means that consumers can trade in two Arrow-Debreu
securities. One of them pays 1 unit of the consumption good if the high dividends state is realized.
Otherwise, it pays zero. The other security only pays (1 unit) in the low dividends state. There is only
one price to be determined: the relative price between these two securities.
The previous market structure would be enough to attain an eﬃcient allocation in an economy with
full information. This is no longer true in the present example. As will become clear in the next section,
an extra asset (and hence another market) would be necessary to attain an eﬃcient allocation with the
information structure assumed before. The present paper studies the case where that is not possible:
markets are incomplete.
The equilibrium price depends on º and Á. A higher value of º means that the high dividend state
is more likely, which makes the contingent claim paying in that state more valuable. A higher Á implies
that a lower fraction of agents needs insurance, which reduces the demand for contingent claims paying
in the low state.
The critical assumption made in the paper is that agents are fully rational and use the information
pooled by the equilibrium price when they update their beliefs. Agents not only learn from their
private signals, but also understand how the price is determined in equilibrium. This allows them to
make inferences about the realizations of º and Á once they have observed the market price. In addition,
the endowment realization also conveys valuable information, as will be described below. Finally, the
paper assumes agents do not behave strategically. They take the price and everyone else’s behavior as
given. This is justiﬁed on the ground that there is a ‘large’ number of agents, so each individual does
not exert any inﬂuence on aggregate variables.
6This result is true if the utility function is concave and shows a decreasing coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. The
latter is deﬁned as
¡u00(c)
u0(c) : The utility function assumed in the present paper (logarithmic) satisﬁes both properties.
82.1 Deﬁnition of equilibrium
Agents maximize expected utility of consumption. They do not know the actual state probabilities,
so they use the information contained in the private signals, the endowment and the market price to
reﬁne their belief about º. We assume the belief consists of the expectation of º conditional on the
price and the agents’ private information. Formally, let Ii denote the private information set of agent
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Pi denotes the price function perceived by agent i. It is used to extract information from the
observed price. For the agent to be able to unveil the information conveyed by the price, he must guess
on the equilibrium relationship between the price, º and Á. The next subsection describes in more detail
how agents compute their beliefs in the class of economies we analyze.















subject to (1 ¡ p)cl + pch = W = ai + (1 ¡ p)dl + pdh
cl;ch ¸ 0
where: u(c) denotes the utility function; cj denotes planned consumption in state j; ai denotes the
riskless endowment of a type i agent; dj denote the dividends paid by the tree in state j; and W denotes
individual wealth. The sum of the prices of the Arrow-Debreu securities is normalized to 1.
If each agent receives n signals, there are 2(n + 1) diﬀerent types: an agent can receive either a
high or low riskless endowment combined with n+1 diﬀerent signals realizations. For simplicity, the
paper assumes that the distribution of signals in the population is independent from the distribution
of riskless endowments. Denote by ¹i (º;Á;n) the measure of agents i in the population. For instance,
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denote the aggregate demand in state i.














We are now ready to deﬁne a competitive equilibrium for this class of economies.
Deﬁnition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) consists of a measurable price function p :













solve consumer i’s problem 8 i = 1;:::;2(n + 1) and
8 º 2 I; Á 2 Φ.
(2) Markets Clear: Zj (p(º;Á);¹(º;Á);p(¢);:::;p(¢)) = Yj 8 j = l;h and º 2 I; Á 2 Φ.
Radner (1979) provides a more general deﬁnition of the equilibrium concept deﬁned above. 7 An
important assumption implicit in Deﬁnition 1 is that the individuals’ perceived price function coincide
with the actual equilibrium function. Agents, fully understand how prices are determined and take that
into account to update their beliefs. Notice that in general, ﬁnding a solution of the previous problem
requires solving for a ﬁxed point functional equation: the price function perceived by the agents must
coincide with the price function generated by their behavior.
In what follows we consider a simpliﬁed version of the framework described above. That reduces
the generality of the results but allows us to characterize the equilibrium in some cases. Even though
the conclusions depend on the speciﬁc assumptions we make, the economies analyzed do not belong
to a negligible set, i.e. the results are robust to any perturbation of the primitives: utility function;
dividends and endowment process; and joint distribution of º and Á.
2.2 Finding the equilibrium: a particular case
We choose a logarithmic utility function because it has the advantage that individual demands are linear
in wealth. The optimal consumption rules are speciﬁed in equation (2). It is assumed for simplicity that
7Dubey et al. (1987) criticize the REE approach because it assumes implicitly that prices pool individuals’ private
information before they trade. Nonetheless, the approach has been extensively used in the literature, showing that, despite
its limitations, it constitutes a useful tool to analyze problems with asymmetric information
10the random variables º and Á are independent. º is drawn from a uniform distribution with support
[0;1], while Á takes a high value Áh with probability ¼ and a low value Ál with probability 1 ¡ ¼.
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In order to help to understand how the model works, we assume for the moment that each agent
receives only one signal. This implies that there are four diﬀerent types of agents in the model. They
are listed below with their corresponding measure.
² ºÁ agents with high endowment and a good signal (denoted by ¯ 1),
² (1 ¡ º)Á agents with high endowment and a bad signal (denoted by ¯ 0),
² º (1 ¡ Á) agents with low endowment and a good signal (denoted by 1
¯
),
² (1 ¡ º)(1 ¡ Á) agents with low endowment and a bad signal (denoted by 0
¯
).
In equilibrium, aggregate planned consumption for the high state must equal aggregate resources in
that state. If that equality holds, by Walras’ law, the other market is also in equilibrium. The market

















= Á¯ a + (1 ¡ Á)a
¯
+ dl; (3)
where ¯ a denotes the high value of the riskless endowment and a
¯
its low value.
The equilibrium price is obtained after replacing individual demands into the market clearing con-
dition.
p(º;Á) =
Á(¯ a + dl)
h
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¯ 0
i





¯ + (1 ¡ º)˜ º0
¯
¤







¯ 1 + (1 ¡ º)˜ º
¯ 0¤
+ (1 ¡ Á)[º˜ º1





It is easy to show that this model does not possess a fully revealing equilibrium. The reasoning is
as follows. The agents’ private signals and endowments do not convey enough information to reveal the
realization of (º;Á). Thus, the only way in which agents can infer the values of those variables is if in
equilibrium there is a one to one mapping between (º;Á) and the equilibrium price. In other words, for
11prices to be fully revealing, there must be only one possible realization of º consistent with a given price
and value of Á. The equilibrium relationship between º and the last two variables in the fully revealing
case is described in equation (5). 8
º (p;Á) =
p[Á¯ a + (1 ¡ Á)a
¯
+ dh]
Á¯ a + (1 ¡ Á)a
¯
+ (1 ¡ p)dl + pdh
(5)
It is apparent that there is more than one combination of º and Á consistent with a given price. This
contradicts the hypothesis that prices are fully revealing. Furthermore, it suggests that the equilibrium
is pairwise revealing: the market price reveals that the probability of high dividends could have taken
one of two possible values. Thus, individual beliefs consist on a weighted some of those values. The
weights are determined by the signal and endowment received.
In order to understand how the price depends on º and Á, it is helpful to consider again the case
where both variables are common knowledge. In that case, the equilibrium price function is given by
pFR (º;Á) =
º [Á¯ a + (1 ¡ Á)a
¯
+ dl]
Á¯ a + (1 ¡ Á)a
¯
+ dh ¡ º (dh ¡ dl)
: (6)
The relative price trivially increases with º. As the high state becomes more likely, agents demand
more contingent claims paying in that state. It can easily be shown that the equilibrium price also
increases with Á. We have already mentioned that ‘poor’ agents (with a low riskless endowment) are
de-facto more risk averse than ‘rich’ agents, so the former ones buy insurance from the latter, i.e. agents
with a low endowment transfer consumption from the high dividend state to the low dividend state. 9
As the fraction of rich individuals (Á) increases, there are less agents demanding contingent claims that
pay in the low state, so their relative price decreases, i.e., p increases.
8Equation 5 is obtain after replacing individual beliefs ˜ º
i in equation (4) by the actual realization of º.
9Let µh denote the net demand of contingent claims that pay only if the high state is realized. The agent is endowed
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From the individual ﬁrst order conditions and the aggregate resource constraint, it transpires that ch > cl for every
agent. Thus, a suﬃcient condition for the previous inequality to hold is that the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion
decreases with consumption. The utility function assumed in the present paper satisﬁes this property.
12Presumably, the equilibrium price in the economy with asymmetric information is also increasing in
both arguments. We found this to be true in all the simulations performed.
2.2.1 Beliefs’ updating scheme
The equilibrium price speciﬁed in equation (4) takes the values of the beliefs as given. But, as it was
explained before, the latter are a function of the market price and the price function itself. This section
explains in more detail how agents compute their beliefs.
Figure 1 shows how agents extract the information pooled by the market price. Every agent is
assumed to know the price function. So when they observe a particular price, say p0 in the picture,
they infer that only two values of º could have been realized: º (p0;Ál) or º (p0;Áh). The ﬁrst one
corresponds to the value of º consistent with a price p0 and a low fraction of highly endowed agents.
The second one corresponds to the value of º consistent with a low fraction of highly endowed agents.
Since agents ignore the actual distribution of riskless endowments, they cannot distinguish which of the
previous values corresponds to the actual realization of º. But agents not only learn from the market
price. Their private signals and endowments reveal information. An agent with a high endowment
believes that it is more likely that the fraction of rich agents is Áh rather than Ál, so he assigns more
weight to º (p0;Áh). An agent with a good signal believes that it is more likely that the highest º was
realized.
We now formalize the previous argument taking the case of an agent who has received a high riskless
endowment and a good signal. The beliefs’ updating schemes of the remaining agents follow the same
logic.
The paper assumes that each agent’s belief regarding the probability that the tree pays high dividends
consists of the expectation of º conditional on his private information and the market price, namely
˜ º
¯ 1 (p) = E [Pr(tree pays dh) j signal = 1;endowment = ¯ a;price = p]
= º (p;Áh)Pr(º (p;Áh) j 1;¯ a;p) + º (p;Ál)Pr(º (p;Ál) j 1;¯ a;p):
The second equality takes into account that once the agent has conditioned on the price, the prob-
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Figure 1: Information revealed by the price function
last expression, and then use the implication that once we condition on the fact that Nature has picked
a particular value of Á, the following events are mutually independent: the tree pays high dividends;
the agent receives a good signal; and the agent receives a high riskless endowment. The result is the
following equation:
˜ º
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Finally, equation (7) is obtained after replacing the probabilities in the last expression by their actual
values. Recall that the probabilities of receiving a good signal and a high riskless endowment coincide
with the actual realizations of º and Á, respectively.
˜ º
¯ 1 (p) =
º (p;Áh)º (p;Áh)Áhg (p j Áh)¼ + º (p;Ál)º (p;Ál)Álg (p j Ál)(1 ¡ ¼)
º (p;Áh)Áhg (p j Áh)¼ + º (p;Ál)Álg (p j Ál)(1 ¡ ¼)
(7)
14The function g (p j Ái) denotes the density of the price conditional on Ái, where
g (p j Á) = f (º (p;Ái))
@º (p;Ái)
@p
= f (ºi (p))º0
i (p)
The last equality just simpliﬁes the notation. The subindex i denotes the fraction of rich agents in
the economy, i.e. Ái, and f (¢) denotes the density function of º. 10 The intuition for the formula of the
conditional density is that a price p is likely to be observed when the value of º consistent with that price
is likely to be drawn, i.e. f (º) is high, or when the price function pi (:) is not sensitive to º at ºi (p). An
heuristic description of the last argument is provided in the picture below. Consider an hypothetical
case when it is known that the price lay on the range [p0; p1]. Its actual value, however, is not observed.
In that case, agents infer that º belong to [ºh (p0); ºh (p1)] if the fraction of rich agents is Áh, and to
[ºl (p0); ºl (p1)] if the fraction is Ál. In the case where º is drawn from a uniform distribution, the
probability of observing a price in [p0; p1] consists of the length of the interval [ºi (p0); ºi (p1)], which is
clearly higher for price function p(¢;Ál). In the limit, as the length of the price range collapses to a single
point, the likelihood of observing a particular price becomes inversely proportional to the derivative of
the price function at that point, or directly proportional to º0
i (q):
The beliefs of the remaining types are described in (8) ¡ (10).
˜ º
¯ 0 (p) =
¼f (ºh)º0
hÁh (1 ¡ ºh)ºh + (1 ¡ ¼)f (ºl)º0
lÁl (1 ¡ ºl)ºl
¼f (ºh)º0
hÁh (1 ¡ ºh) + (1 ¡ ¼)f (ºl)º0





h (1 ¡ Áh)º2
h + (1 ¡ ¼)f (ºl)º0
l (1 ¡ Ál)º2
l
¼f (ºh)º0
h (1 ¡ Áh)ºh + (1 ¡ ¼)f (ºl)º0





h (1 ¡ Áh)(1 ¡ ºh)ºh + (1 ¡ ¼)f (ºl)º0
l (1 ¡ Ál)(1 ¡ ºl)ºl
¼f (ºh)º0
h (1 ¡ Áh)(1 ¡ ºh) + (1 ¡ ¼)f (ºl)º0
l (1 ¡ Ál)(1 ¡ ºl)
(10)
Notice that the equilibrium price aﬀects the beliefs in two ways. First, for a given market price
p, agents use the equilibrium price function to retrieve the possible realizations of º: ºh (p) and ºl (p).
Second, they use the derivative of the price function (º0
h (p) and º0
l (p) ) in order to assess how likely are
those points.
10The paper assumes a uniform distribution over the interval [0; 1], so the density is just the constant 1. However, it





































The structure of the model is similar to Ausubel (1990a) and Ausubel (1990b). He also analyzed
an economy with partially revealing prices and where the state of the economy is characterized by
two variables: one continuous and the other dichotomous. In our framework, the ﬁrst one would be
represented by º and the second one by Á. The diﬀerence is that he considered the case where a fraction
of the population is fully informed while the rest is uninformed and must learn from the equilibrium
price. This structure allowed him to prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. In Ausubel (1990a)
he is also able to obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium price using speciﬁc assumptions about
the utility function and the distribution of the continuous variable. Unfortunately, his results do not
extend to the present framework. Our model does not allow for a tractable analytical solution. But
an approximate solution can be found using numerical techniques. The appendix provides a detailed
description of the procedure followed to ﬁnd the equilibrium.
3 Parametrization
The model presented before builds on many restrictive assumptions. This allows us to ﬁnd a (numerical)
solution but has the disadvantage that the resulting model is highly stylized and has a limited ability
16to replicate real data. Thus, the parameters that characterize the dividends and endowment’s processes
are not chosen following a standard calibration exercise, i.e. they are not based on actual data. There
are other reasons that motivate the previous choice. The fact of considering a risky asset that lives for
only one period does not allow to mimic the returns of any aggregate stock index. 11 Besides, in order
to calibrate the process of the riskless endowment it would be necessary to consider not only the labor
income of stockholders, but also other sources of income, like the returns to private businesses, which
are not easy to obtain.
The strategy, therefore, is to choose a baseline parametrization that helps to illustrate the eﬀect
the paper tries to emphasize. To that end, the worst realization of the riskless endowment is allowed
to take a relatively low value in order to magnify the diﬀerent attitudes toward risk of rich and poor
agents. This increases the sensitivity of the equilibrium to changes in the distribution of endowments
(controlled by Á). Similarly, if the dividend dispersion was low, equilibrium state prices would lay
close to the corresponding state probability, regardless of the realization of Á. In that case, agents’
beliefs would tend to coincide with the actual realization of º, and the economy would behave almost
as if everyone were fully informed. A disperse dividend realization is necessary to avoid that result.
In summary, we restrict attention to the case where the lower realizations of the riskless endowment
and dividend take small values compared to their higher counterpart. Both are necessary to generate
signiﬁcant belief’s heterogeneity in the model. The parameters chosen are speciﬁed in the table below.
dh = 1 dl = 0:1
¯ a = 1 a
¯
= 0:5
Áh = 0:8 Ál = 0:2
¼ = 0:5 º » U (0;1)
11If the risk free bond is taken as numeraire, the expected return of the tree for a given realization of º and Á in an
economy with full information is
R(º;Á) =
ºdhp
dl (1 ¡ p) + dhp
+
(1 ¡ º)dl (1 ¡ p)
dl (1 ¡ p) + dhp
; where p = p(º;Á):
The gross return is below 1 for almost all realizations of º and Á. This implies that the model cannot generate positive
net rates of returns of the risky asset, as it is observed in the data.
174 Results
Figure 2 compares the equilibrium prices between an economy with full information and an economy with
asymmetric information (agents receive one signal). The graph shows that the monotonicity property
of the price function is preserved in the asymmetric information framework. It also illustrates that
when the economy is hit with a good endowment shock (Á = Áh), the relative price of the high dividend
state is higher in the asymmetric information case compared to the full information case. The result
is reversed when the economy is hit with a bad shock. The explanation rests on the beliefs’ updating
scheme. Consider again Figure 1 on page 14. Interpret the picture as the price scheme of the case
where all the population but a single agent is fully informed. The unlucky agent has to infer º from the
price observed in the market and his private information. If the values º (p0;Ál) and Ál are realized, the
agent’s belief lays below the actual realization of º. The equilibrium price is not aﬀected because that
single agent has measure zero and so his behavior does not inﬂuence aggregate variables. However, if the
fraction of agents who are imperfectly informed increases, the average belief in the economy decreases
and the equilibrium price falls, as can be deduced from equation (4). Eventually, if no agent is fully
informed, the average believe is below the actual realization of º. This implies that the equilibrium
price is below its level in the full information economy, as Figure 2 shows. The previous argument holds
for any realization of º. A similar logic can be used to explain why the equilibrium price is higher in
an economy with asymmetric information and a high realization of Á.
Figures 3-4 graph the beliefs as a function of the price. It shows that the value of the riskless
endowment conveys more information than the signal about the tree. Agents with low endowments are
more optimistic than the rest, independently of the signal received. An agent hit with a low riskless
endowment assigns more weight to the possibility that Á = Ál than a rich individual. This means that
receiving a low endowment can be taken as a signal that the actual º is closer to ºl (p) than ºh (p). The
ﬁrst value is higher than the second one, explaining why poor agents tend to be more optimistic.
The heterogeneity in beliefs along with the diﬀerence in the endowments induce agents to trade. In
Section 2 we stated that in an economy with full information, rich agents sell contingent claims that
pay in the low state. This may not be true in the present case. Poor agents are more optimistic than
wealthy individuals, so the ﬁrst ones may have now an incentive to transfer resources to the high state.
184.1 Deﬁnitions of welfare
The objective of the paper is to assess, in a framework with asymmetric information, whether the
receipt of more accurate public information increases or reduces individual welfare. But as Holmstrom
and Myerson (1983) point out, the heterogeneity in private information raises a question that is not
present in an economy with complete information: what is the appropriate measure of welfare? For
instance, expected utility can be computed as a function of each agent’s private information or it can
be computed prior to the receipt of any private information. Holmstrom and Myerson denote the
ﬁrst concept as interim utility and the second one as ex ante utility. The paper employs the last two























¯ j (º;Á) denotes the expected utility of an agent with j good signals and high riskless en-
dowment, conditional on the information possessed at the node (º;Á). Similarly, Uj
¯ (º;Á) denotes the
conditional expected utility of an agent with low risk riskless endowment and j good signals. The
conditional expected utility of an agent of type i is computed as follows:















The decision rules that govern consumption in both states are the same as in equation (2) on page
11. Notice that even though agents are not able to observe º, the actual state probabilities are used to
compute the expected utility of each type. It is easy to check that if those probabilities were replaced
by agents’ beliefs, the formula would yield the same level of ex ante utility. The formulation in equation
(12) is chosen because it stresses that more precise information aﬀects ex ante welfare only through its
inﬂuence on the consumption allocation rules.
The model considered in this paper assumes there is no ex ante heterogeneity. Agents diﬀer only
after they have received endowments and signals. Thus, ex ante utility consists of a scalar variable. Even
thought the previous measure is informative and allows us to evaluate aggregate welfare, it limits the
ability to compare our results with the previous literature (that assumes exogenous heterogeneity). For
19that reason, we also provide a measure of interim welfare. The latter is computed after each individual
has received his riskless endowment but prior to observing any signal or the market price, namely
E (u j a) =
2 X
i=1
Pr(Ái j a)E [u j a;Ái]; where (13)









ºi (1 ¡ º)
(n¡i) U
¯ i (º;Ái)dº;











ºi (1 ¡ º)
(n¡i) Ui
¯ (º;Ái)dº:
Pr(Ái j a) is computed using Bayes’ rule.
The formula above assumes that agents update the probability distribution of Á before computing
their expected utility. The reason is twofold. First, it is consistent with the rest of the paper, i.e.
agents are fully rational and use all the available information when they evaluate their expected utility.
Second, and also related to the previous reason, it is consistent with the ex ante utility measure. If
the unconditional probability distribution of Á had been used in equation (13), it would not have been
possible to relate both welfare measures.
For the sake of simplicity, the previous welfare measures were computed under the assumption that
agents receive only one signal. They can easily be generalized to the multiple signal case.
4.2 Welfare and the precision of information
Appendix B considers a simpler version of the model, where agents learn only from public signals. It
shows that as the number signals increases, information becomes more precise in Blackwell’s sense (see
Blackwell (1953)). The information structure assumed in this paper is diﬀerent, though. Instead of
learning from a public signal, agents learn from the market price and private information. This leads to
a richer model but has the disadvantage that it is no longer possible to apply the standard deﬁnition of
better information used in the literature. The result in Appendix B may support the conjecture that the
precision of the information increases with the number of signals. In order to compare two information
structures, then, we provide a measure of how ‘far’ are the beliefs with respect to the actual realizations
of º. As it is described at the end of the section, that measure conﬁrms the presumption that receiving
20more signals implies more accurate information.
We are now ready to present the main result of the paper. Figure5 and Figure 6 show that welfare
may be nonmonotonic in the precision of information. The relationship between welfare and the number
of signals is described by a reverse J curve. This is independent of individual endowments, implying
that ex ante welfare follows the same pattern.
The values at the boundaries of the graphs correspond to the null and complete information cases.
It is not surprising that expected utility under full information is lower than under no information. The
reason is the following. Uncertainty about º and Á introduces an extra source of risk in the economy.
Some agents would like to insure against ‘bad’ realizations of those variables, while others could gain
from selling insurance. We consider economies where that market is missing. Agents trade only after
observing their private information and market price. Given the previous restriction, the best allocation
is attained when agents trade knowing their riskless endowment but with no information about º. 12
In that economy, even if there was another trading round after the value of º has been disclosed, there
would be no further net trade. 13 Prices would adjust in order to accommodate to the new ‘belief’,
but the consumption allocation would remain invariant. This result was ﬁrst pointed out in Marshall
(1974). On the other hand, if markets open after the value of º has become common knowledge, there
are less opportunities to share risks. For instance, if º takes an extreme value (zero or one), one of
the Arrow-Debreu securities is valueless and no trade takes place. The example illustrates a general
principle: the better the information agents possess, the lower the possibility to insure against ‘bad
news’. This is known as the Hirshleifer eﬀect.
Blackwell (1953) was the ﬁrst to formalize the intuitive result that more information is welfare
enhancing. In his framework, agents receive an informative signal about the state and then choose
an action a out of a set A. He shows that, as the signal transmits more accurate information, agents
enjoy a higher degree of freedom when decide the optimal action. In the event that the signal is fully
informative, agents can condition their decision on the actual state. Blackwell’s result, though, relies on
the fact that the set A does not change with the precision of information. Hirshleifer (1971) shows that
this assumption cannot be maintained in a general equilibrium model. In a competitive environment,
12The paper restricts attention to economies where agents cannot insure against endowment shocks.
13The endowment allocation prior to the second trading round consists of the equilibrium allocation obtained in the ﬁrst
trading round.
21the arrival of more precise information about the state of the economy aﬀects the equilibrium prices
and through that, it modiﬁes each individual’s budget constraint. In fact, as it is stated in the previous
paragraph, better information limits the opportunities to share risks, which in turn oﬀsets Blackwell
eﬀect.
Several authors have studied the implications of Hirshleifer eﬀect in more general environments.
More recently, Schlee (2001) provides quite general conditions under which the receipt of better infor-
mation leads to a Pareto inferior allocation, meaning that no agent is better oﬀ, and at least some agent
is worse oﬀ (as long as the arrival of more precise information modiﬁes the consumption allocation).
Unlike previous papers, Schlee’s conclusion does not depend on any speciﬁc assumption about agents’
initial level of information: his result holds for any informational improvement, and not only when
agents receive partial information starting from no information.
Figures 5 and 6 point out that there exist endowment economies with competitive markets in which
individual welfare may increase with the precision of information. The graphs show that both types
of agents enjoy higher expected utility under full information compared to the situation when they
receive one signal. The Hirshleifer eﬀect is still present in our model, but the asymmetric information
assumption introduces an extra adverse eﬀect on trade that is not observed in Schlee’s paper.
The dispersion of beliefs is such that decreases agents’ needs to participate in the market. In an
equilibrium with homogeneous beliefs, individuals with a high riskless endowment provide insurance
to poor agents by selling risk free bonds and purchasing shares of the tree. In the economy we study,
however, there is disagreement in the beliefs about º. Rich agents are more pessimistic than poor agents.
This feature is summarized in Figure 8. The picture shows that for any realization of º, poor agents’
average beliefs are above the actual º, while rich agents’ average beliefs are below º. This induces a
contraction in the demand and supply of insurance compared to the full information setting. Thus,
an economy with partial information displays a lower magnitude of trade than the economy where º is
common knowledge. The latter accounts for the diﬀerence in welfare between those two cases.
More generally, Figures 5 and 6 summarize the interaction between two eﬀects. At the corners
we observe the pure Hirshleifer eﬀect, while at the ‘interior’ points the negative eﬀect caused by the
heterogeneity in beliefs plays a role. Both forces limit the opportunities to share risks. That explains why
the arrival of better information always reduces welfare if agents have initially no information. However,
22the consequences of receiving better information starting from a situation of partial information are
ambiguous. The receipt of more signals strengthens the Hirshleifer eﬀect at the same time that it
weakens the heterogeneous beliefs eﬀect (agents’ beliefs tend to concentrate). If the latter outweighs
the former eﬀect, we should observe a welfare increase following the arrival of more precise information.
This is the situation described in the graph.
If the argument described in the previous paragraph is correct, we should expect welfare and trading
volumes to be strongly correlated with each other. Figure 7 conﬁrms this feature. The average volume
of trade displays the same reverse J curve as welfare.
We cannot use Blackwell’s criterion to compare the degree of precision between diﬀerent information
structures, so we are not able to assess a priori whether receiving more signals implies better information
or not. As it may be expected, though, there is a positive ex post relationship between the number of
signals received and the accuracy of the beliefs. This is conﬁrmed by Figure 8, which shows that the
distance between individual beliefs and the actual realizations of º shrinks as the number of signals
increases. In addition, this result seems to hold for every possible value of º and Á. Figure 9 uses a
simple measure to quantify the precision of the beliefs. 14 The picture also supports the conjecture
that more signals imply better information.
4.3 Incentives to acquire information
We have shown how the receipt of informative signals can hurt everyone in the economy. But this result
relies on the assumption that agents actually use all the available information to compute their beliefs.
The assumption should not be maintained if each individual ﬁnds that it is in his own interest to ignore
all or part of the information received. We presume this is not the case in our model. Recall that no
agent can exert any inﬂuence on the aggregate. This implies that, from the point of view of a single
agent, the arrival of better information has a pure Blackwell eﬀect, so it should be welfare enhancing.
The chart below illustrates the private incentives to use information in a particular case. It describes
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23the expected utility of an individual who lives in our benchmark economy: the set of agents who use
all the information available to update their beliefs has full measure. Besides, agents receive only one
signal. It’s clear that every other choice, but to use the information contained in the price, the signal
and the endowment realization, leads to a worse decision rule.
Individual Welfare when diﬀerent
pieces of information are used 15
Rich Poor
Price, signals and endowment 100.0000 100.0000
Price and endowment only 99.9966 99.9966
Price and signals only 99.8008 99.8008
Price only 99.7932 99.7931
Signal only 87.5619 87.5619
No information 82.7408 82.7408
Similarly, consider an economy where no one uses any information. In that case, agents’ beliefs
are homogeneous and coincide with the unconditional expectation of º. But if an individual decides
to incorporate the information revealed by the signal to update his belief, he will enjoy an increase in
welfare (expressed in terms of consumption) of 5:98% or 6:11% depending on whether he has received
a high or low riskless endowment, respectively.
Even though the complexity of the model does not allow us to prove the conjecture that every
individual has a private incentive to use all the available information, we could show that this is true
for the baseline parametrization. The result has an additional implication. If agents were required to
pay for the signals and that cost were suﬃciently low, then every individual would eﬀectively acquire
a signal. 16 But that would lead to an overacquisition of information due to the Hirshleifer and
heterogeneous beliefs eﬀects. A similar result is reported in Berk (1997) using a model with strategic
behavior.
15Welfare is expressed in terms of certainty equivalent consumption. The latter is normalized to 100 in the case where
the individual uses all the information available.
16For simplicity, we assume at the moment that agents can only purchase one signal.
245 Concluding remarks
Hirshleifer was the ﬁrst to point out that in a general equilibrium framework, better information may
leave some agents worse oﬀ. Although he considered a simple example, his conclusion has proven to be
robust to several generalizations. In a recent paper, Schlee analyzed a general class of economies and
concluded that better information reduces the expected utility of every agent.
The present work stresses that those results depend crucially on the existence of homogeneous
beliefs. We consider an economy with endogenous heterogeneity, asymmetric information and partially
revealing prices. The paper identiﬁes two eﬀects through which information aﬀects the equilibrium
allocation: the well known Hirshleifer eﬀect; and an adverse eﬀect induced by the heterogeneity in
beliefs. From an ex ante perspective, both eﬀects limit the possibilities to share risks and therefore,
have a negative impact on welfare. In this setup, the arrival of more precise information strengthens
the Hirshleifer eﬀect at the same time that it weakens the heterogenous beliefs eﬀect. It is not possible
to establish a priori which eﬀect dominates, raising the possibility that welfare might be nonmonotonic
in the precision of information. The paper focuses on the last case. It analyzes an example where
the impact of better information on welfare depends on the initial level of information: more precise
information increases welfare in an economy with partial information; but it decreases welfare in an
economy with no information.
To the best of our knowledge, the mechanism explaining the result has not been explored in the
literature. The closest antecedent of this work is Citanna and Villanacci (2000). They also consider an
economy with asymmetric information and partially revealing prices. Like this paper, they conclude
that welfare may increase after the arrival of more accurate information. But they argue that the result
is explained by wealth eﬀects due to changes in relative prices (they study a multiple good economy).
The policy implications derived from the present work also diﬀer from the previous literature. If the
ﬁrst best cannot be implemented (agents trade prior to the arrival of information), it might be possible
to ﬁnd policies that lead to a Pareto superior allocation. Those policies must induce agents to acquire
more information.
From a security design perspective, the example studied in the paper favors a complete market
structure. Introducing a new security in a partial information economy would complete the markets
25and allow agents to fully infer the value of º. In that case, the second best allocation would be attained.
However, if we depart from the benchmark setup, it may be possible to get back the inverse relationship
between welfare and the precision of information. 17 In those economies, an incomplete ﬁnancial
structure is optimal. 18
17That kind of relationship would be observed in economies where the dispersion of beliefs is not as strong as in our
example.
18See Mar´ ın and Rahi (2000) for more on this topic.
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29A Technical Appendix
In order to study diﬀerent properties of the equilibrium, we must ﬁnd a price function p(º;Á) that
satisﬁes certain conditions. The equilibrium is deﬁned then by a particular relationship between the
price, º and Á, which means that any of these variables can be expressed as a function of the other ones.
It simpliﬁes the exposition to write º as a function of p and Á, so we proceed that way. If agents receive
only one signal, the function º (¢) satisﬁes equation (A.1). The formula follows from the equilibrium
price equation (4) on page 11. It also takes the beliefs as exogenously given.
ºi (p) = º (p;Ái) =
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More generally, if agents receive n signals, the equilibrium price is given by
p(º;Á) =
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which is nonlinear in º. The latter precludes the possibility of obtaining a functional expression for
º (¢), though it is possible to approximate the last function using numerical techniques.
Before describing the numerical algorithm, notice that the object that needs to be found (the function
º (¢)) has inﬁnite dimension, whereas numerical techniques only allow to solve for ﬁnite dimensional
problems. Our strategy consists of parameterizing º (¢) as the weighted sum of Chebychev polynomials.
Namely,






























¯ p ¡ p
¯
¶
for j = l;h














are the corresponding weights and Ti (¢) is the
Chebychev polynomial of order i.
Tn (x) = cos(ncos¡1 x)
With this approach, the choice of the polynomial family becomes an important issue. We use
Chebychev polynomials because they are mutually orthogonal and allow for an eﬃcient parametrization
of º (¢). Finally, notice that the problem simpliﬁes now to ﬁnding a ﬁnite number of parameters, instead
of an entire function. The algorithm that solves the problem is laid down below.
1) A grid for p is deﬁned using the expanded Chebychev array (see Judd (1998), page 222).
~ p = (p0;p1;:::;pN); where p0 = 0 and pN = 1. The grid deﬁnes the points at which the functions
º (¢) and ˆ º (¢) are evaluated.
2) A closed form solution exists in the full information economy. (see equation (5) on page 12) Thus,
a ﬁrst set of values for the parameters ~ ah and ~ al is obtained after equating the approximate function







i=1 found in 2) are then used as an initial guess to solve for the system of
equations deﬁned by G(¢).
Gij (~ ah;~ al) = ºj
¡





; i = 0;1;:::;N; j = l;h
(A.2)
The function ºi (ºh;ºl;º0
h;º0
l;p) refers to the same object as equation (A.1), but the arguments
are diﬀerent. The new formulation does not take the beliefs as exogenously determined. Instead, it
includes as additional arguments the equilibrium values of º consistent to a price p (and the two possible
realizations of Á) and the derivatives of the price function, captured by º0
i. The last four variables are
necessary to compute the beliefs, as can be seen in equations (7)-(10).
The system of equations (A.2) summarizes the ﬁxed point problem. The function G
j
i (¢) does the
following. It takes the set of parameters that deﬁnes ˆ ºh (¢) and ˆ ºl (¢) as arguments. Then, it computes
ºh (pi), ºl (pi) and their derivatives by evaluating the corresponding parameterized functions ˆ º (p; ~ aj)
and ˆ º0 (p; ~ aj) at each price pi in the grid. If the approximate functions ˆ º (¢) are suﬃciently close to
31the actual equilibrium functions, the evaluation of ºj (:;pi) at the values described in the last sentence





i (¢) should be close to zero. Therefore, the purpose of the
algorithm is to ﬁnd the root of the system of equations deﬁned above.
The root is found using a modiﬁed Powell hybrid algorithm and a ﬁnite-diﬀerence approximation to















i (~ ah;~ al)
2 < 10¡12





i (~ ah;~ al)
¯
¯ ¯ at these prices is never larger than 10¡5: The maximum deviation observed is below
10¡3 and is always located at prices close to the corners. The latter suggests the numerical solution we
obtain is very close to the actual one.
32B Comparing information structures
Let us introduce the following modiﬁcations to the baseline model presented in the paper:
1. the signals about the tree are public;
2. there is no uncertainty regarding the distribution of riskless endowments, i.e. the fraction of highly
endowed agents is common knowledge.
Given the previous assumptions, the equilibrium price does not reveal more information than what
the public signals does. The other diﬀerence with respect to the model considered in the main text,
is that the economy is now characterized by the realization of one variable: º. Agents try to infer the
latter using the information contained in the public signal. More formally, we assume agents observe a
signal s from a set S. The latter has ﬁnitely many components: S = fs1;s2;:::g. The components of
S are deﬁned as follows:
s1 = 1, agents observe one good signal out of one;
s2 = 0, agents observe one good signal out of one;
s3 = (1;1), agents observe two good signals out of two;
s4 = (1;0), agents observe one good and bad signal out of two;
s5 = (0;0), agents observe two bad signals out of two;
s6 = (1;1;1;), agents observe three good signals out of three;
. . ..
Thus, each si corresponds to a particular realization of the binary signals structure. The conditional
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if n = N;
. . .
An information structure consists then of a collection of signals and their corresponding prob-
abilities for every possible realization of º. In the present framework, an information structure is
33fully speciﬁed by the number of binary signals agents observe (n), and it is denoted by In, where
In = fS;¼n (º) for º 2 [0;1]g. The advantage of this set up is that it allows us to apply Blackwell’s
criterion to compare the degree of informativeness of two information structures.
Deﬁnition B.1 Information structure In is more informative than In0
if there is a transition prob-
ability function t(s0;s) : S £ S ! [0;1], such that
P1




j (º) 8 º 2 [0;1].
The intuition behind the deﬁnition is simple. Each realization si under information structure In0
can
be interpreted as being obtained from In by adding some noise through a process of randomization. In
other words, the more informative structure is suﬃcient for the less informative.
Proposition B.2 In is more informative than In0
() n > n0
Proof. We prove ﬁrst that n > n0 ) In is more informative than In0
. For the sake of simplicity,
consider the case where n0 = n¡1. The argument can easily be extended to any n0 < n. The objective
then is to ﬁnd a transition probability matrix ti;j that replicates the probability distribution ¼n0
(º) after
being applied to ¼n (º) for all º. It can be shown that only n(n + 1) coeﬃcients need to be computed.





t11 t12 ::: t1n+1
t21 t22 ::: t2n+1
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n 0 0 ::: 0 0 0
0 1 ¡ 1
n
2
n 0 ::: 0 0 0
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is a solution of system (B.1).
34It remains to be shown that if In is more informative than In0
then n > n0. Assume that n0 = n+1.







t11 t12 ::: t1n+1
t21 t22 ::: t2n+1
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
























































The ﬁrst equation implies that a linear combination of º0;º;:::;ºn¡1 and ºn must equal ºn+1 for
all º in the interval [0;1]. This is clearly not possible. The same argument holds for any n0 > n + 1.
It is intuitive that a higher number of binary signals entails more precise information. We have
showed above that this is true in a similar setting to the one described in the main text, and when the
Blackwell’s criterion is used to compare information structures. Unfortunately, the former criterion can-
not be applied to our baseline model. In that framework, the degree of informativeness is endogenously
determined.
35C Graphs




























Figure 2: Equilibrium price under full and partial information

















Figure 3: Diﬀerence between individual beliefs and actual realizations of º for the case
Á = Ál

















Figure 4: Diﬀerence between individual beliefs and actual realizations of º for the case
Á = Áh









Figure 5: Welfare of rich agents as a function of the number of signals










Figure 6: Welfare of poor agents as a function of the number of signals








Figure 7: Aggregate volume of trade as a function of the number of signals
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Figure 8: Diﬀerence between average beliefs and actual realizations of º as a function of
the number of signals











Figure 9: Precision of beliefs as a function of the number of signals
40